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FRANK M. COFFIN LECTURE ON LAW
AND PUBLIC SERVICE
Editor's Note:
The Second Annual Frank M. Coffin Lecture on Law and Public
Service was held on October 7, 1993. Professor Arthur M. Schles-
inger, jr. presented "Multiculturalism and the Bill of Rights." Fol-
lowing the presentation, faculty and friends adjourned to honor
Professor Schlesinger and Judge Coffin. Dean Zillman's words of
thanks were followed by Judge Coffin's poetic tribute to the Second
Coffin Lecturer.
ODE TO AN HISTORIAN
Frank M. Coffin*
Dear Clio, the Muse of History,
Has kindly prepared this list for me
Of classical pundits great and small
Who now for ages have held in thrall
All who wish to learn from the past
In hopes this trouble-filled world would last.
To begin with a Greek, a bit odd to us,
The Father of History, old Herodotus,
Whose writing lacked the pellucidities
Of that politic-minded admiral, Thucydides.
Then Xenophon and the younger Cyrus
On whom he lavished much papyrus.
And out of the post-Hellenic dark
The fabulous parallel Lives of Plutarch.
Then last, as the Greeks pack up to leave us,
I have to mention the Jew, Josephus.
Now come the Romans, with plenty of ballast,
First of all, the quotable Sallust
And one to whom state secrets were privy,
The ever agreeable, sieve-like Livy.
Then, standing firm but never whiny,
The stoical, elegant Elder Pliny.
* Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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But who could bend the Tower of Pisa?
With plenty of Gaul, ambitious Caesar.
The Caesars, of course, appeared euphonious
Through the limpid pen of old Suetonius.
If these are not enough to last us,
We wind up with the lively Tacitus.
This is enough of a Call of the Roll.
I could extend this celebrity poll,
But enough is enough
For a history buff.
So I rise to toast
One from whom we learn -
Not a mutant turtle ninja,
But one so cool he'd never roast,
Attempt to burn,
Or, much less, singe ya-
Our guest of honor
Arthur Schlesinger.
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MULTICULTURALISM AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS
Arthur Schlesinger, jr.
It is a high honor to be invited to deliver the second Frank M.
Coffin Lecture on Law and Public Service-all the more so because I
follow in the footsteps of the two Americans who have done most in
our lifetime to sustain the Bill of Rights: the brave and wise Justice
William Brennan and that great-hearted advocate of individual free-
dom and equal opportunity who died a year ago, Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.
It is a high honor, but it is also a considerable intimidation. Who
can possibly meet the standards so recklessly set in the first Frank
Coffin lecture? Moreover, I am not a lawyer, and before a law school
audience especially I must plead forbearance for the simplicities and
solecisms to come. Historians have their uses, but most of my pro-
fession drift helplessly when plunged into the Sargasso Sea of legal
technicality.
Still I am comforted by the thought that this lecture is in the
name of Frank Coffin, who is one of the most humane and tolerant
as well as one of the most sagacious men I have ever known. Frank
and I go back a long way together. We first met nearly forty years
ago when Democrats were a beleaguered minority downeast, and
Frank and Ed Muskie revived and reconstructed the Maine party. I
knew him when he served so ably in the House of Representatives,
and we worked together in those exhilarating days when John Ken-
nedy was President of the Republic. In the years since I have
watched his distinguished career on the bench with the greatest ad-
miration. His book The Ways of a Judge seems to me the most sub-
tle, just, and illuminating exercise in judicial self-analysis since the
great Cardozo's The Nature of the Judicial Process. I am glad to
report that Judge Coffin's fine new book On Appeal is soon to
appear.
As a judge, Frank Coffin has been notable for his understanding of
the impact on public law of pressures of social change, especially, as
he has written, "the pressures of limits to resources, energy, space,
privilege, opportunity, wealth, travel, education, and many other ne-
cessities and amenities to which we are only now being introduced,
after two centuries of faith in infinite growth, resources, and
opportunities."1
This is much the situation foreseen a century ago by Woodrow
Wilson. "America," Wilson wrote in 1889 in a review of Bryce's The
American Commonwealth,
is now sauntering through her resources and through the mazes of
1. FRANK M. COFFIN, THE VAYs OF A JUDGE 228 (1980).
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her politics with easy nonchalance; but presently there will come a
time when she will be surprised to find herself grown old,--a coun-
try crowded, strained, perplexed,-when she will be obliged. .. to
pull herself together, adopt a new regimen of life, husband her re-
sources, concentrate her strength, steady her methods, sober her
views, restrict her vagaries, trust her best, not her average, mem-
bers. That will be the time of change.2
Wilson's time of change is rushing upon us. And Frank Coffin has
observed of judges in the maelstrom, "Their most elusive mission is
that of safeguarding individual rights in a majoritarian society with
due regard to the legitimate interests of that society"-a quest that,
if pursued broadly and sensitively by citizens in addition to judges,
can go far, he hopes, "toward making tolerable the coiled-spring ten-
sion under which we have been chartered to live. '" 3
Of the many changes that have overtaken America since Frank
Coffin and I were young, one of the most striking is summed up in
that relatively new word "multiculturalism." In a way, it is odd that
this concept should be so new, since the United States has been
from birth a multiethnic society. But through most of the history of
the republic multiculturalism has been seen as a stage in the absorp-
tion of newcomers into a common American nationality and culture.
In recent years, however, multiculturalism has developed an ideol-
ogy and mystique of its own. In its militant form, it becomes a chal-
lenge to, even a hold-out against, the historic process of absorption
and the idea of a common nationality. It is in this sense that the
word has suddenly invaded everyone's radar screen, that it has ex-
cited such spirited, often angry, debate and that it leads some today
to advocate the reinterpretation and curtailment of the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution.
The first point I would make about the contemporary debate is
that multiculturalism is by no means a uniquely American issue. To
understand its true significance, we must think about multicultural-
ism against the global backdrop and in the terms of the transition
the whole world is making from one grand historical epoch to the
next.
The twentieth century may well appear in retrospect as an era
defined above all by the warfare of ideologies. It was a time when
the liberal democratic idea was under siege by two mortal foes, two
variations on the totalitarian idea: the challenge of fascism in the
first half of the century; the challenge of communism in the second.
Democratic society finally succeeded in defeating both totalitarian
creeds: fascism perishing with a bang, communism with a whimper.
For the moment, democracy has won the ideological war.
2. Woodrow Wilson, Bryce's American Commonwealth, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUAR-
TERLv, 153, 164-65, March 1889 (book review).
3. COFFIN, supra note 1, at 249.
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But the fading away of the ideological conflict does not mean, as
some sages optimistically forecast, the "end of history." One set of
hatreds replaces another. Lifting the iron lid of ideological repres-
sion in Eastern Europe and what used to be the Soviet Union re-
leases pent-up ethnic, national, religious, linguistic antagonisms
deeply rooted in history and in memory. The evaporation of the
Cold War removes superpower restraints on national and tribal con-
flicts in the Third World.
As the warfare of ideologies subsides, the world thus enters-or,
more precisely, re-enters-a possibly more dangerous era of ethnic
and racial warfare. If the twentieth century was the century of the
warfare of ideologies, the twenty-first century promises to begin as
the century of the warfare of ethnicities-and this, it should be
noted, is a much older, profounder, and more unyielding form of
warfare, one whose roots go back forever in time. In the words of
Klaus Kinkel, the German foreign minister, "As if buried beneath a
sheet of ice. . . ethnic conflicts were in a state of suspended anima-
tion under communist rule. Now that this sheet has cracked, these
conflicts are surfacing violently."'
The tragedy of Yugoslavia is only the most murderous portent of
a darkening future. A Yugoslav political scientist, Simon Petrovic,
put it well the other day: "Minorities are going to be an acid test for
all post-communist societies. With communism all but disappearing
tribal instincts are coming back."5 And the hostility of one tribe for
another is among the most ancient and most instinctive of human
reactions.
Yet the history of our planet has been in great part the history of
the mixing of peoples, and never more so than today. As our twenti-
eth century staggers to a close, many factors-not alone the evapo-
ration of the Cold War but, more enduringly, the development of
swifter modes of communication and transport, population growth,
the breakdown of traditional social structures, the flight from chaos,
from tyranny, from poverty, from famine, from ecological disaster,
the dream of a better life somewhere else-drive people in mass mi-
grations across national frontiers. According to the United Nations
report on the world's refugees presented by the United Nations
High Commissioner in November 1993, the number of refugees flee-
ing their homelands has grown from 2.5 million in 1970 to nearly 20
million today; another 24 million have been forced into exile within
their own countries. In short, more than one in every 130 inhabi-
tants of the globe is today a refugee.6
4. Quoted in J.O. Tamayo, BUFFALo NEws, July 7, 1992.
5. Pascal Privant, Yugoslavia" Bloodshed in the Balkans, NEwsWEE, Sept. 9,
1991, at 40.
6. Paul Lewis, Stoked by Ethnic Conflict, Refugee Numbers Swell, N.Y. TwEs,
Nov. 10, 1993, at A6.
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The planet shrinks, and its population is more intermingled than
ever before. At the same time, the world is torn in opposite direc-
tions, whipsawed between intense pressures toward globalization on
the one hand, toward fragmentation on the other. The world mar-
ket, electronic technologies, instantaneous communications, fax ma-
chines, CNN-all these undermine the nation-state and lead toward
a world without frontiers. Yet these very internationalizing
processes drive people to seek refuge from global currents they feel
to be beyond their control and understanding. The more people see
themselves as cast adrift in a vast impersonal, uncontrollable world,
the more desperate they become to bury themselves in some famil-
iar, intelligible, comprehensible human unit, the more they crave a
politics of identity. So the more the world globalizes, the more it
fragments.
What happens when people of different ethnic origins, speaking
different languages and professing different religions, settle in the
same geographical locality and live under the same political sover-
eignty? Unless a common purpose binds them together, tribal re-
sentments and enmities will drive them apart. No one in the nine-
teenth century thought more carefully about problems of
representative government than John Stuart Mill. The two elements
that defined nationality, as Mill saw it, were the desire to be gov-
erned together and the "common sympathy" created by shared his-
tory, values, and language. He wrote,
Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of
different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, es-
pecially if they read and speak different languages, the united pub-
lic opinion, necessary to the working of representative government,
cannot exist .... [1]t is in general a necessary condition of free
institutions, that the boundaries of government should coincide in
the main with those of nationalities.'
In the modern world those boundaries coincide less and less. Na-
tionhood is at best difficult both to achieve and to sustain. Events
every day demonstrate the fragility of national cohesion; and no one
can doubt that ethnic, racial, religious warfare is replacing the war-
fare of ideologies as the explosive issue of our age. On every side
today, ethnic and religious fanaticism is the cause of the breaking of
nations.
The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia have already bro-
ken up. India, Lebanon, South Africa, Ireland, Israel are all in eth-
nic or religious turmoil. One form or another of ethnic or religious
cleansing divides Sri Lanka, Burma, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iraq,
Turkey, Ethiopia, Somalia, Nigeria, Liberia, Angola, Sudan, Zaire,
Guyana, Trinidad-you name it. Even nations as stable and civilized
7. JOHN STUART MILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 289, 291-92 (1861).
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as Britain, France and Germany, Belgium, Spain and Austria, face
rising ethnic, racial, and religious troubles. "[T]he virus of tribal-
ism," says the Economist, "risks becoming the AIDS of international
politics-lying dormant for years, then flaring up to destroy
countries."'
Take the case of America's neighbor to the north. Canada has
long been considered among the most sensible and sedate of nations.
"Rich, peaceful and, by the standards of almost anywhere else, envi-
ably successful," the Economist comments: yet today "on the brink
of bust-up."9 Michael Ignatieff (the English-resident son of a Rus-
sian-born Canadian diplomat and thus an example of the contempo-
rary mixing of peoples) writes of Canada, "Here we have one of the
five richest nations on earth, a country so uniquely blessed with
space and opportunity that the world's poor are beating at the door
to get in, and it is tearing itself apart .... If one of the top five
developed nations on earth can't make a federal, multiethnic state
work, who else can?"' 0
The answer to that increasingly urgent question has been, at least
until recently, the United States.
Now how have Americans succeeded in pulling off this almost un-
precedented trick? Other countries break up because they fail to
give ethnically diverse peoples compelling reasons to see themselves
as part of the same nation. As Chinua Achebe, the Nigerian novelist,
writes of his own country, one of the richest in Africa but now on
the verge of chaos, "This is the Nigerians' greatest weakness--their
inability to face grave threats as one people instead of as competing
religious and ethnic interests."'" The United States has thus far of-
fered diverse cultures reasons to face grave threats as one people.
What is it then that, in the absence of a common ethnic origin, has
bound Americans together over two turbulent centuries?
For America has been a multiethnic country from the start. Hec-
tor St. John de Cr~vecoeur emigrated from France to the American
colonies in 1759, married an American woman, settled on a farm in
Orange County, New York, and published his Letters from an
American Farmer during the American Revolution. This 18th cen-
tury French American marveled at the astonishing diversity of the
other settlers-"a mixture of English, Scotch, Irish, French, Dutch,
Germans, and Swedes.. .," a "strange mixture of blood" that you
8. War in Europe, EcoNoNusr, July 6, 1991, at 13.
9. John Grimond, For Want of Glue; Nice Country, Nice Mess, EcoNomisr, June
29, 1991, at 3.
10. Michael Ignatieff, A Rich Nation is Tearing Itself Apart, LONDON OBSERVMR,
June 9, 1991.




could find in no other country.12 "From this promiscuous breed," he
wrote, "that race now called Americans have arisen."1" (The word
race as used in the eighteenth century meant what we mean by na-
tionality today; thus people spoke of "the English race," "the Ger-
man race," and so on.) What, Crev~coeur mused, were the character-
istics of this newly emergent American race? In the Letters from an
American Farmer he propounded a now famous question: "What
then is the American, this new man?' 1 4 (We must overlook eight-
eenth century male obliviousness to the existence of women.)
Cr~vecoeur gave his own question its classic answer:
He is an American, who leaving behind him all his ancient
prejudices and manners, receives new ones from the new mode of
life he has embraced, the new government he obeys, and the new
rank he holds .... The American is a new man, who acts upon
new principles ....
Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of
men.
1 5
The first great American historian soon reinforced Cr~vecoeur's
point. "Annihilate the past of any one leading nation of the world,"
George Bancroft wrote,
and our destiny would have been changed. Italy and Spain, in the
persons of COLUzmus and ISABELLA, joined together for the great
discovery that opened America to emigration and commerce;
France contributed to its independence; the search for the origin of
the language we speak carries us to India; our religion is from Pal-
estine; of the hymns sung in our churches, some were first heard in
Italy, some in the deserts of Arabia, some on the banks of the Eu-
phrates; our arts come from Greece; our jurisprudence from Rome;
our maritime code from Russia; England taught us the system of
Representative Government; the noble Republic of the United
Provinces bequeathed to us, in the world of thought, the great idea
of the toleration of all opinions; in the world of action, the prolific
principle of federal union. Our country stands, therefore, more
than any other, as the realisation of the unity of the race.10
E pluribus unum: one out of many. The United States had a bril-
liant solution for the inherent fragility, the inherent combustibility,
of a multiethnic society: the creation of a brand-new national iden-
tity by individuals who, in forsaking old loyalties and joining to
make new lives, melted away ethnic differences-a national identity
12. J. HECTOR ST. JOHN DE CRPVECOEUR, LETRs FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER 47
(1782).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 49.
15. Id. at 49-50. (emphasis added in the last sentence).
16. GEORGE BANCROFT, LITERARY AND HISTORICAL MISCELLANIES 508 (1855).
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that absorbs and transcends the diverse ethnicities that come to our
shore, ethnicities that enrich and reshape the common culture in the
very act of entering into it. The goals of those who came to America
were escape, deliverance, assimilation. They saw America as a trans-
forming nation, banishing dismal memories and developing a unique
national character based not on common ethnic origins, but on com-
mon political ideals and experiences. The point of America was not
to preserve old cultures, but to establish a new American culture.
Americans have never, until very recently, believed in ancestor
worship.
From the Revolution on, Americans have had a vigorous sense of
national identity, forged in the War for Independence, articulated in
the Declaration of 1776 and the Constitution of 1787, deepened by
the subsequent experience of self-government. George Washington
affirmed the national creed when he invited "the oppressed and per-
secuted of all Nations and Religions" to come to America, but not,
he suggested, in clannish groups, sticking to themselves; rather to
come as individuals prepared for "intermixture with our people" so
that they could be "assimilated to our customs, measures and laws:
in a word, soon become one people." 7 John Quincy Adams as Secre-
tary of State advised prospective immigrants to "cast off the Euro-
pean skin, never to resume it. They must look forward to their pos-
terity rather than backward to their ancestors."' 8 America has its
own identity, derived from its own experience and its own ideals.
From the start, citizenship was defined, at least for white America,
not by bloodlines but by political principle-not by jus sanguinus
but by an adaptation of jus soli.
When Alexis de Tocqueville came to America half a century after
the adoption of the Constitution, he wondered how this miscellane-
ous American society, "formed of all the nations of the world...
people having different languages, beliefs, opinions: in a word, a so-
ciety without roots, without memories," could turn into a single na-
tion.' 9 The answer, Tocqueville decided, was that nations could be
based on adherence to an idea. The American secret, he concluded,
was the national commitment embodied in the Constitution to de-
mocracy, self-government, individual freedom and equality before
the law. It was this common purpose that would enable Ameri-
cans-at least white Americans-to forge a single culture and a sin-
gle nation from people of bewilderingly diverse racial, religious, eth-
17. 34 THi WRIrrINs OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MAlusCRm-r 23
(John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., 1940).
18. John Quincy Adams in a letter to Mr. Morris de Furstenwaerther, quoted in
WERNER SOLLORS, BEYOND ETHNICITY 4 (1986).
19. Letter from Alexis de Tocqueville to Ernest de Chabrol (June 9, 1831) in
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, SELECTED LETTERS ON POLITICS AND SocIErY, 38 (Roger
Boesche, ed. & Jame Toupin & Roger Boesche, trans., 1985).
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nic, and linguistic origins. The rights of citizenship, the experience
of political participation, the development of a civic culture-these
would dissolve ethnic and religious differences and become the great
national unifier.
National unification had its brutal limits, as we shall soon note.
Yet half a century after Tocqueville another great foreign observer
of the American commonwealth, the Britisher James Bryce, was
similarly struck by "the amazing solvent power which American in-
stitutions, habits, and ideas exercise upon new-comers . . . quickly
dissolving and assimilating the foreign bodies that are poured into
her mass."20 Half a century after Bryce, a third perceptive foreign
observer, Gunnar Myrdal of Sweden, in his great study of race rela-
tions, An American Dilemma, found the essence of the "solvent
power" in what he called the American Creed and showed why that
Creed held out hope even for those most cruelly excluded by the
dominant white majority, the Creed acting as the spur forever goad-
ing white Americans to live up to their proclaimed principles.21
This vigorous sense of national identity accounts for America's
relative success in converting Cr~vecoeur's "promiscuous breed" into
Washington's "one people." Of course it remains a vital part of
America for people to cherish their own traditions, observances, pa-
rades, rituals, creeds, customs, cuisines. It is these strands of partic-
ularity that bring richness and texture to our society. Ethnicity has
always had pretty free cultural expression, while the power of politi-
cal principle and civic experience as instruments of assimilation has
enabled the mixture of ethnicities to coalesce into a single nation.
This is not to say that the United States has lived up to its own
best ideals. New waves of immigration brought in peoples who fitted
awkwardly into a society that was inescapably English in language,
ideas, and institutions. For a long time Anglo-Americans dominated
American culture and politics. The melting process did not easily
melt immigrants from Ireland, from Germany, from southern and
eastern Europe. Still even those snubbed and spurned by the Anglo-
Americans were enabled by the exercise of democratic rights to
enter into, join and remold the American culture.
As for the non-white peoples-those already in America whom the
European newcomers overran and massacred, or those others hauled
in against their will from Africa and Asia-deeply bred racism put
them all, red Americans, black Americans, yellow Americans, brown
Americans, well outside the pale. We must face the shameful fact:
historically America has been a racist nation. After all, white Ameri-
cans started out as a people so confident in our own racial superior-
ity that we felt licensed to kill red people, to enslave black people,
20. 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 709, 328 (1888).
21. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
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and to import yellow and brown people for peon labor. We white
Americans have been racist in our laws, in our institutions, in our
customs, in our conditioned reflexes, in our souls. The curse of ra-
cism has been the great failure of the American experiment, the
glaring contradiction of American ideals and the still crippling dis-
ease of American life.
Yet even non-white Americans, miserably treated as they were,
contributed to the formation of the national identity. They became
members, if third-class members, of American society and helped
give the common culture new form and flavor. Like white Ameri-
cans, black Americans did not cling to their past but rather helped
change the present and the future. The infusion of non-Anglo stocks
steadily reconfigured the British legacy and made the United States,
as we all know, a very different country today from Britain.
This vision of America as possessing a national identity of its own,
superseding and absorbing the diverse ethnicities of those who came
here, prevailed through most of the two centuries of the history of
the United States. But recent years have brought forth a new and
opposing vision. In a nation marked by an even stranger mixture of
blood than Cr~vecoeur had known, his question-"What then is the
American, this new man?"-is asked once more, with new inten-
sity-and with new answers. Today many Americans disavow the
historic purpose of "a new race of men." The escape from origins
has given way to the search for roots.
In place of a distinctive American nationality, there has arisen a
cult of ethnicity. This cult began among non-Anglo white minorities.
Michael Novak's book of 1971, The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics,
was, as its title suggests, a direct challenge to theorists of the melt-
ing pot. "The new ethnic politics," Novak wrote, "asserts that
groups can structure the rules and goals and procedures of Ameri-
can life."22 This view was rapidly taken up by non-white minori-
ties-all joining to denounce the ideas of assimilation, integration,
the melting pot, and to protect, promote, and perpetuate separate
ethnic and racial communities. This is the multicultural challenge to
the traditional concept of American nationhood.
The eruption of ethnicity has had some healthy consequences. It
has forced the American culture at last to acknowledge the inexcus-
able persistence of group inequalities and to give shamefully over-
due recognition to the achievements of minorities subordinated and
ignored during the high noon of Anglo dominance. American educa-
tion has begun at last to reflect on the existence and significance of
the great swirling world beyond Europe. All this is to the good. The
balance between unum and pluribus had tilted too far toward unum
at the expense of pluribus, and the multicultural challenge has
22. MICHAEL NOvAK, THE RISE OF THE UNumLTABLE ErTics 270 (1972).
1994]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
helped valuably to restore the balance.
But, pressed too hard, the cult of ethnicity has disturbing conse-
quences, too. It tilts the balance too far in the other direc-
tion-toward pluribus at the expense of unum. The ethnic gospel in
its militant form rejects the unifying concept of a unique American
identity. It rejects the vision of individuals from all nations melted
into a new race. It rejects the ideals of assimilation and integration.
It rejects the common culture. Its underlying philosophy is that
America is not a nation of individuals at all but a nation of groups,
that ethnicity is the defining experience for Americans, that ethnic
ties are permanent and indelible, that Americans must be primarily
classified according to ethnic and racial criteria and that division
into ethnic communities establishes the basic structure of American
society and the basic meaning of American history.
While the ethnic interpretation of American history, like the eco-
nomic interpretation, is valid and illuminating up to a point, it is
fatally misleading and wrong when presented as the whole picture.
The ethnic interpretation, moreover, repudiates the historic theory
of America-the theory of Americans as "one people," the theory
that has thus far managed to keep American society whole.
Instead of a transformative nation with a unifying national iden-
tity, America in this new revelation is seen as preservative of diverse
alien identities. Instead of a nation composed of individuals making
their own unhampered choices, America is seen as a collection of
ethnic and racial tribes, each more or less ineradicable in its com-
mitments and loyalties. This latter-day exaltation of ethnic and ra-
cial separatism abandons historic American purposes, replacing as-
similation by fragmentation, integration by apartheid, a single
nation founded on an idea by a multiple nation formed on separate
ethnic communities. It reverses the national motto: making it ex
unius plurimum-many out of one.
"The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin,"
Theodore Roosevelt once said, "of preventing all possibility of its
continuing to be a nation at all, would be to permit it to become a
tangle of squabbling nationalities, an intricate knot of German-
Americans, Irish-Americans, English-Americans, French-Americans,
Scandinavian-Americans, or Italian-Americans, each preserving its
separate nationality. '23
Three quarters of a century later we must add a few more nation-
alities to TR's brew. But what was a nightmare for TR is the dream
of radical multiculturalists today. If that dream were fulfilled, if
each of our manifold ethnic and racial groups were huddled in its
own enclave, holding itself apart from the rest in the sacred name of
23. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, Fear God and Take Your Own Part, in 20 THE WORKS
OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT (The Roosevelt Memorial Ass'n ed., 1925).
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diversity, would this really lead to a more equable, happy, peaceful,
strong, unified country?
Yet this remains the project of the ideologues of militant mul-
ticulturalism. In the interests of this project, they reject not only
America as a common culture but the First Amendment in its con-
temporary understanding.
Our modern civil liberties doctrine, it is true, took time to evolve.
The First Amendment only forbade Congress to pass laws in re-
straint of the freedoms of speech, press, and worship. The founding
fathers did not believe that the Bill of Rights outlawed state prose-
cutions for seditious libel or for blasphemy. The sainted Jefferson
himself, exasperated by belligerent Federalist editors, told the gov-
ernor of Pennsylvania, "I have therefore long thought that a few
prosecutions of the most prominent offenders would have a whole-
some effect." '2 4 But the Fourteenth Amendment and subsequent ex-
ercises in judicial incorporation created the contemporary American
understanding of civil liberties.
That understanding can be summed up in familiar phrases ut-
tered largely by justices in dissent but eventually pronounced by
court majorities the law of the land. However familiar these phrases
may be, they bear repetition. "The question in every case," said Jus-
tice Holmes, "is whether the words are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent."25 "No danger flowing from speech," said Justice
Brandeis,
can be deemed cledi and present, unless the incidence of evil ap-
prehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is oppor-
tunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discus-
sion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence.28
Freedom, Justice Holmes emphasized, means not just "free thought
for those who agree with us"-what great virtue resides in
that?--"but freedom for the thought that we hate. '27
Freedom for the thought that we hate: this is the proposition that
now falls under attack from a multicultural perspective. Through
most of this century, the thought that we hated had been totalitar-
ian political thought: fascism, Nazism, communism. That was the
age of the warfare of ideologies. Many argued that free speech
should not be used to undermine free speech; that the privileges of
24. Letter to Governor Thomas McKean (Feb. 19, 1803), in LEONARD W Lmv',
JEFFERSON AND CvnL LIBERTIES THE DARKER SIDE 59 (1963).
25. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
26. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
27. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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liberty should not be available to those who would employ these
privileges to destroy liberty. Under pressure, first of hot war and
then of cold war, the Supreme Court gave ground from time to time
in construing First Amendment protection of hateful ideological ut-
terance. But in the main the Bill of Rights survived hot and cold
wars intact.
Thus in the midst of the Second World War, at a time of the
highest patriotic fervor with the life of the nation truly at risk, the
Court threw out as a violation of the First Amendment a West Vir-
ginia statute requiring school children to salute and pledge alle-
giance to the American flag. 28 "If there is any fixed star in our con-
stitutional constellation,"' wrote Justice Jackson, "it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in polit-
ics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .... ,,29 This
decision against compulsory flag salutes and pledges of allegiance
was handed down when young Americans were fighting and dying on
many fronts for flag and country. But the American people in 1943,
far from denouncing the Court, applauded the decision as a pretty
good statement of what we were fighting for.
In the later years of the Cold War, the Court, in Brandenburg v.
Ohio,30 reaffirmed and reformulated Holmes's clear and present dan-
ger test. In the Skokie case,-" the Court upheld the right of neo-
Nazis to march down the streets of an Illinois town inhabited by
Holocaust survivors and their families. Hurt feelings were not con-
sidered enough to justify a reduction of constitutional protection. As
Justice Brennan wrote in Texas v. Johnson,3 2: "If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. '33
In defending the First Amendment, the Court in nearly all these
cases was repelling attacks from the right. In those days conserva-
tives and hyperpatriots were the militant advocates of repression
and censorship. But in a bizarre switch of roles, attacks on the First
Amendment and the demand to suppress the thought that we hate
come these days from the left. Even more ironically, that demand is
centered in our colleges and universities-exactly the places above
all others where unlimited freedom of expression had previously
been deemed sacred. And those who lead the assault on the Holmes-
Brandeis-Jackson-Brennan conception of the Bill of Rights do so in
the name of the multicultural society.
28. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
29. Id. at 642.
30. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
31. Colin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
32. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
33. Id. at 414.
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The traditional understanding of the Constitution has been that it
is a document written for a nation composed of individuals and that
the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect rights for individuals.
The multicultural ideologues approach the Constitution from a dif-
ferent perspective. They regard the Constitution as a document
written for a nation composed of groups and therefore would curtail
the traditional understanding in order to protect rights for groups.
Thus, Professor Kathryn Abrams of the Cornell Law School de-
plores "the constitutional habit of considering rights-bearers as un-
affiliated individuals.' She argues that "expression is overpro-
tected" in the United States and that "we need limits on free
expression in intellectual life" in order to enhance "respect for and
recognition of politically marginalized groups."3' ,
This theory of the Constitution as the bulwark not of individual
but of group rights undermines our current civil liberties doctrine.
But that theory has behind it potent emotions-the emotions of
Holocaust survivors at Skokie, the emotions of women long sub-
jected to discrimination, harassment and abuse, the emotions of all
oppressed and harried minorities.
As Henry Louis Gates, Jr., the W.E.B. DuBois Professor of the
Humanities at Harvard, has recently written: "Civil liberties are re-
garded by many as a chief obstacle to civil rights .... The byword
among many black activists and black intellectuals is no longer the
political imperative to protect free speech; it is the moral imperative
to suppress 'hate speech.' "6
The very phrase "hate speech" is new. It does not appear as a
concept or even as an index entry in Leonard Levy's invaluable En-
cyclopedia of the American Constitution published in 1986, or in
Kermit E. Hall's Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court pub-
lished in 1992. Nor does the related phrase "political correctness"
make it as a concept or as an index entry in either of these useful
works. According to a New York Times computer search, there were
103 newspaper references to "political correctness" in 1988; 10,000
in 1993Y.
We must not be too quick to dismiss the case for suppression of
hate speech. As the warfare of ideologies emphasized for many the
vulnerability of free society to fascist and communist propaganda
and led to demands that society protect itself, so the warfare of
34. Kathryn Abrams, Creeping Absolutism and Moral Impoverishment: The Case
for Limits on Free Expression, in American Council of Learned Society, Occasional
Paper No. 22, Tm Ltsrrs oF ExPREssioN N AhmcANINTELLEcTUAL LIFE (New York,
1993).
35. Id.
36. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20 & 27, 1993.
at 37.
37. An All-American Industry, ECONoMIST, Dec. 25, 1993, at 27.
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ethnicities emphasizes the vulnerability of free society to racist divi-
sion and conflict and leads to comparable demands for self-protec-
tion. Democratic governments, with memories of the Holocaust and
apprehensions about growing ethnic hostilities, are naturally and
honorably concerned to arrest the spread of tribal and racial
hatreds.
The United Nations has been in the forefront of the drive to de-
clare, in the words of the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, "as an offence punisha-
ble by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or
hatred ... ."3 The United States has signed this document, but
the Senate has thus far refused to ratify it on the ground that it is
not compatible with the First Amendment.
One can understand why Germany, in the light of its own experi-
ence, would ban neo-Nazi groups as a clear and present danger to
society. But western democracies with secure democratic traditions
have passed laws punishing-to use the language of the British Ra-
cial Relations Act of 1965-the circulation of materials aimed at fo-
menting "hatred against any section of the public in Great Britain
distinguished by color, race, ethnic or national origins," including
the use of "threatening, abusive, or insulting" words. Section 319 of
Canada's Criminal Code is similarly designed to prohibit hate prop-
aganda against racial and religious minorities.39
The adoption of such laws in other democracies strengthens the
case of those who would censor hate speech in the United States.
Nor is there any mystery why the agitation for censorship finds a
special location in our universities. The problem of hate speech ac-
quires peculiar poignancy in educational settings.
It is no fun running a university these days. White students can
often be cruel in the exclusion of minorities, their wanton harass-
ment, their heavy-handed pranks, their vile and wounding cracks.
Minority students, for the most understandable reasons, are often
vulnerable and frightened. Racial jokes, slurs, epithets hurled by
majority bullies pose difficult questions for educational administra-
tors. Consider how a shy and scared black student at the University
of Michigan must have felt when posters appeared around the cam-
pus parodying the slogan of the United Negro College Fund: A
MIND IS A TERRIBLE THING TO WASTE-ESPECIALLY ON
A NIGGER. Or consider how Jewish and other white students at
Kean College in New Jersey must have felt when a Nation of Islam
speaker said that Jews had only themselves to blame for the Holo-
caust and that blacks, when they acquire power in South Africa,
should give whites twenty-four hours to depart the country and then
38. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SociETY 356 (1992).
39. R.S.C., ch. C-46 § 319 (1985) (Can.).
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kill all who remain:
We kill the women. We kill the babies, we kill the blind. We kill
the cripples. We kill them all. We kill the faggot. We kill the les-
bian .... When you get through killing them all, go to the god-
damn graveyard and dig up the grave and kill them a-goddamn-
gain because they didn't die hard enough. 0
After a while, university administrators begin to ask themselves:
which is more important-protecting hate speech or stopping racial
persecution? Does not the tolerance of racism prevent minority stu-
dents from joining the life of the university on equal terms? Does
not the Bill of Rights protect equality as well as liberty? Does not
hate speech destroy equality and thereby nullify the very premises
of education? "[T]he right of free expression," says the Stanford
University Discriminatory Harassment Provision, "can conflict with
the right to be free of invidious discrimination"-so it is proper to
ban words "commonly understood to convey direct and visceral ha-
tred or contempt for human beings on the basis of their sex, race,
color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic
origin. ' Nor is there any loss thereby, because the opinions banned
are in their nature without redeeming social value.
One has a certain sympathy for beleaguered administrators who,
doing their best to keep the peace and give minority students an
equal chance, try to crack down on bigoted speech. More than three
hundred institutions, according to the First Amendment Center of
the Freedom Forum in Nashville, have speech codes. Those adopted
by the University of Michigan and the University of Wisconsin have
been invalidated by the courts as manifestly unconstitutional.42
Others, more narrowly drawn, make ingenious claims to constitu-
tionality-some resting on the argument that the purpose of the
First Amendment is to insure worthwhile public debate and on a
"two-tier" distinction between high-value and low-value speech;' 3
some on the proposition that the constitutional guarantees of liberty
and equality are on a collision course and liberty should not be fur-
thered at the expense of equality; the First Amendment right to
speak should not be preferred to the Fourteenth Amendment right
to obtain an equal education. Some proponents like Catharine
MacKinnon even argue that the state has a constitutional duty to
40. John Nordheimer, Divided by a Diatribe, NEW YoRK TiMEs, Dec. 29, 1993, at
31.
41. Susan Mendus, Freedom of Expression: Free Only if Correct?, THE WoRa &
I, Nov. 1993, at 378.
42. Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); UWM Post v.
Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
43. Cass R. Sunstein, Liberalism, Speech Codes and the Related Problems,
ACADEME, July-Aug. 1993, at 14. See also, CAss R. SUNSTM, Dmoc~cv m T
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 121-67 (1993).
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prohibit expression that promotes inequality;44 still others invoke
the "fighting words" doctrine in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,4
though the Supreme Court has found little sustenance in that doc-
trine when employed as anything more than a restatement of clear
and present danger.
As a non-lawyer, I am not rash enough to pass on the constitu-
tional merits of the various arguments for the abridgment of the
First Amendment. Free speech is not an absolute; no judgment can
escape the balancing of competing values. We regulate speech every
day through statutes punishing libel, slander, false advertising, per-
jury, criminal solicitation, and so on. But in a free democracy the
presumption must always lie in favor of free speech unless an over-
whelming practical case can be made for regulation and censorship.
And as a historian, I may perhaps be permitted comment on the
practical impact of racist speech and of anti-racist legislation-an
impact that some regard as sufficiently powerful to justify repres-
sion, though censorship of racist expression could well create prece-
dents for future censorship of other sorts of expression.
It is even suggested that the creation of such precedents does not
matter since free speech is no help to minorities anyway. "African-
Americans and other people of color," Professor Charles Lawrence
of the Stanford Law School tells us, "are skeptical about the argu-
ment that even the most injurious speech must remain unregulated
because, in an unregulated marketplace of ideas, the best ones will
rise to the top and gain acceptance. Experience tells quite the oppo-
site. People of color have seen too many demagogues elected by ap-
pealing to America's racism.'4
6
One wonders where Professor Lawrence has been over the last
half century. For experience tells us on the contrary that, in the un-
regulated marketplace of ideas, the idea of white supremacy has
vanished and the idea of racial equality has been accepted in princi-
ple if not, alas, in practice. There are few stronger arguments for the
unregulated marketplace of ideas than the transformation of race
relations over the half century. Read Gunnar Myrdal's An American
Dilemma,"7 and compare it to the situation today. When I was
young, senators and congressmen would orate about the necessity of
"white supremacy"; but in the last forty years has anyone heard the
phrase on Capitol Hill? I would never have believed it half a century
ago if someone told me that within my lifetime, with black Ameri-
cans only 12 percent of the population, a black general would be
44. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Mary Ellen Gale, On
Curbing Racial Speech, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Winter 1990-91.
45. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
46. Charles R. Lawrence, III, Acknowledging the Victim's Cry, ACADEME, Nov. -
Dec. 1990, at 10, 14.
47. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944).
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chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, black justices would sit on the
Supreme Court, there would be a black governor of Virginia and
black mayors in Atlanta, Birmingham, New Orleans, and other
southern cities as well as in New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los
Angeles, Kansas City, Detroit, Seattle. It was precisely the First
Amendment, Professor Gates reminds us, that "licensed the pro-
tests, the rallies, the organization and the agitation that galvanized
the nation."4 s
The struggle for racial justice is far from over; there are still miles
to go before we sleep; but changes have been made. One doubts that
these changes would have come faster if we had followed Professor
Lawrence and prohibited racist speech. What that would have done
is to elevate neo-Confederates into great champions of the Bill of
Rights.
No one needs an untrammeled First Amendment more than those
who seek to change the status quo. Radicals are always in the minor-
ity, and minorities gain most from the protections of the Bill of
Rights. Free speech may often be offensive, odious, repulsive, an in-
strument of domination and oppression; but historically it has been
far more significant as a means-no, the means-of liberation. As
Norman Corwin, whom the more venerable will remember as the au-
thor half a century ago of that once celebrated radio program on the
Bill of Rights called "We Hold These Truths," put it- "The Bill of
Rights doesn't offer freedom from speech. To silence an idea be-
cause it might offend a minority doesn't protect that minority. It
deprives it of the tool it needs most-the right to talk back."'0
A more positive argument for censorship is that educational insti-
tutions must take a stand against bigotry. But surely there are many
ways short of censorship that educational leadership can discourage
and condemn bigotry. Censorship breeds its own evils. In some insti-
tutions radical professors and students lay down a party line, de-
nounce deviationists as politically incorrect and even drive them
from the lecture platform. The rise of left-wing thought police re-
minds one of the right-wing students who in Joe McCarthy's day
used to haunt the classrooms of liberal professors (like me) hoping
to catch and report whiffs of Marxism emanating from the podium.
Of all institutions, universities surely should have least truck with
censorship.
But thought police are everywhere these days-and once again in
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Of course the FBI has always
shown excessive interest in people's opinions. In the old days of the
warfare of ideologies, G-men asked whether people under considera-
tion for federal appointment had uttered radical political senti-
48. Gates, supra note 36, at 37.
49. Norman Corwin, quoted in WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1992, at A12.
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ments. Today FBI agents ask whether they have uttered words sug-
gesting potential ethnic or racial bias. Jeremy J. Stone, president of
the Federation of American Scientists, the liberal scientific lobby in
Washington, and son of the radical journalist I.F. Stone, reports that
the FBI recently asked friends of a congressional staffer whether he
ever told racist jokes or said anything that indicated prejudice.50
"The FBI," Stone writes, "is not just looking into racist discrimina-
tory actions but eliciting and exploring comments . . . . Anyone
who has ever uttered a statement that could be construed as 'insen-
sitive' to any one of America's minority groups could now be dis-
qualified from a growing number of federal positions." ' 1 The oppor-
tunity for rumor and malice and the chilling effect on private speech
are obvious. Stone wonders, "Will we become a society, as in Soviet
Russia, where certain things cannot be conveyed even to one's clos-
est friends?"52
This obsession with "insensitivity"-saying something that might
hurt somebody's feelings-reinforces the assault on the First
Amendment. Multicultural ideologues emphasize the harm that un-
censored speech is believed to do to defenseless individuals. Unques-
tionably racial slurs and insults can be injurious, but is the injury
words inflict on sensibilities sufficiently weighty and enduring to jus-
tify so drastic a remedy as limitations on freedom of speech? If we
start down that road, we will end endorsing Ayatollah Khomeini and
his crusade against The Satanic Verses. Does the fact that The Sa-
tanic Verses hurts the feelings of devout Muslims really justify the
murder of Salman Rushdie? Let us not forget Bernard Shaw's re-
minder: "All great truths begin as blasphemies."
And how practically effective have those statutes been that are
designed to stop the dissemination of racist ideas? Germany because
of its special experience may well require special measures; but in
neither Britain nor Canada has legislation diminished racism nor
discouraged the merchants of hate; indeed, both countries, despite
their legislation, 53 have seen a dismaying increase in racial incidents.
The Millwall ward in the East London borough of Tower Hamlets
recently elected a councilman representing the neo-fascist British
National Party; and the British Commission for Racial Equality re-
ports that "increasing number of people" say they have "exper-
ienced racism-either directly, when they have been on the receiving
end of verbal abuse, or more subtly, when they have been turned
down for a job."54 In Canada feminists, wielding the legal theories of
50. Jeremy J. Stone, PC Invades the FBI, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1993, at A22.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See supra notes 39-40.




Catherine McKinnon, rejoiced when the Canadian Supreme Court
in Regina v. Butler55 affirmed the power of the state to ban literary
or visual expression that "degrades" and "dehumanizes" women.
But the main consequence has been the seizure by Canadian cus-
toms of books ordered by feminist bookstores. 0 Neither the British
nor the Canadian experience demonstrates that laws mandating re-
pression and censorship are more effective than free discussion in
bringing about a tolerant and harmonious society. Driving thoughts
underground may only cause them to explode later.
When hate speech leads on to physical assault and violence, that
is another matter and one requiring prompt and sharp counterac-
tion. But there are plenty of statutes to deal with violent crime, and
it may well be a good idea to provide for the enhancement of pun-
ishment when hate is demonstrably the motive.
Since the advocacy of censorship in the name of multiculturalism
is couched in the vocabulary of "power" and "hegemony" and as-
sumes that all views and actions are designed to enable one group to
dominate another, one may be permitted to subject multicultural
advocacy itself to the same analysis. Obviously, "political correct-
ness" is a strategy of intimidation in the struggle for intellectual and
educational power. As Professor Linda S. Greene of the University
of Wisconsin Law School candidly confesses, the object is to talk
"about what speech we want to empower people to engage in...
about what we want people to be able to say at the university."5' 7
But the First Amendment denies that anyone should have the power
to decide what people are to be permitted to say.
In the long run there is surely no more self-defeating position for
reformers and radicals than the endorsement of arguments and crea-
tion of precedents for the curtailment of debate and expression. "It
is by the enjoyment of a dangerous freedom," as Tocqueville wrote a
century and a half ago, "that the Americans learn the art of render-
ing the dangers of freedom less formidable." 8
In the short run the idea of bringing harmony to the American
multicultural society through censorship is an evasion of the real
problem. Speech reflects social inequities and disparities; it does not
cause them. If we are serious about bringing minorities into full
membership in our society, our society must provide jobs, schools,
health care and housing; it must provide equal opportunity in em-
ployment and education. The answer lies along these lines. It does
not lie in the amputation of the Bill of Rights.
55. 89 D.L.R. 4th 449 (1992).
56. National Coalition Against Censorship, CENSORSHIP Naws, Issue 4, 1993.
57. Robert H. Bork and Linda S. Greene, The Next-to-Last Word on Political
Correctness, N.Y. Tirms, Dec. 11, 1993, at 23.
58. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 127 (Phillip3 Bradley, ed.,
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1987).
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And, above all, the members of the white majority must open
their minds and hearts. The burden to unify the country does not
fall primarily on the minorities. Those who want to join America
must be received and welcomed by those who think they own
America. Assimilation and integration constitute a two-way street.
Instead of slamming doors against minorities and burning crosses on
their lawns, thereby driving them into defensive and defiant separa-
tism, the majority must begin treating them as they would their
own. Racism is the problem: the assault on the Bill of Rights is only
a misdirected response.
The American population is more heterogeneous than ever. But
this very heterogeneity makes the quest for unifying ideals and a
common culture all the more urgent. Racial harmony is not an im-
possible dream. America, as Scott Fitzgerald said, is "a willingness
of the heart." We have it within our power to make this a fair and a
just land for all our people.
May I recall some words of Mahatma Gandhi-words that used to
be inscribed on public posters throughout India, a country far more
fiercely divided than our own by ethnic and racial and religious and
linguistic antagonisms. "We must cease," Gandhi said, "to be exclu-
sive Hindus or Muslims or Sikhs, Parsis, Christians or Jews. Whilst
we may staunchly adhere to our respective faiths, we must be Indi-
ans first and Indians last.""0 It is because India has abandoned these
teachings of Gandhi that it is so violently and tragically divided
today.
But in the spirit of Gandhi, while we heterogeneous Americans
may staunchly adhere to our diverse traditions, let us never forget
that in the end we are members one of another-Americans first and
Americans last. In a world savagely rent by ethnic and racial fanati-
cism it is all the more essential that the United States continue as
an example of how a highly differentiated society holds itself to-
gether and preserves its liberties.
60. Quoted in E.W. Desmond, Storm Over India, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, May 14,
1992, at 37.
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